No war, no Putin
War is the condition of this regime’s existence. No war, no Putin. That is the situation today.
This is precisely why I believe attempts to reach an agreement with Putin to end the war altogether are unrealistic. If Putin understands that his troops cannot advance any further, it will be possible to negotiate a ceasefire with him. But signing strategic treaties with him would be deceiving ourselves.
If he manages to break Ukraine’s resistance this winter, or later, in the spring, once the situation in Europe has changed in his favor, he will expect political control over Kyiv in addition to the territory he gains.
There is no cheap way to stop him
People very often ask me how Europe can stop Putin, hoping for some idea that would let it do so while doing nothing, or as little as possible.
Let me say it at once: sanctions alone will not stop the war.
Putin is spending the equivalent of roughly $250 billion a year on the war, and the figure may grow. Europe cannot count on spending three or four times less and still winning.
But of course he does have vulnerabilities.
Putin’s vulnerabilities: where are they?
Shrinking civil economy
First, he is forced to divert resources from the civilian sector to the war. This has been going on for almost five years, and it is badly weakening Russia’s infrastructure. If an industrial accident or some other disaster happens, these weaknesses will seriously undermine the regime’s stability.
And if no disaster happens?
Oil money
Second, the regime depends on foreign revenue and foreign supplies, and that makes it vulnerable.
Today Russia’s foreign trade is in surplus: Russia sells more than it buys. Who do we thank for that? The American president and the war in Iran.
The United States and Israel began striking Iran on February 28. Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz then sent oil prices sharply higher, and Russia’s oil export earnings rose with them.
If the oil price were where it was before the war in Iran, Russia’s trade balance would be negative today.
Can anything be done about this? Ask the Americans.
Technology sanctions
Then there is the regime’s dependence on supplies. Technology sanctions constrain it, but not as much as they could. Who do we thank for that? First, of course, China. Second, the European Commission.
Why? With China, I think, the answer is obvious. But why the European Commission?
The Commission, the EU’s executive arm, proposes economic sanctions jointly with the EU’s foreign policy chief and oversees how member states enforce them. The EU has adopted 21 packages of sanctions against Russia so far.
How long is the sanctions list today? How many lines does it have? Ten thousand. How many of them are critical to Putin’s war machine? No more than 500.
Now imagine you are responsible for administering these sanctions. Which is easier to manage: a list of 10,000 or a list of 500?
Back in Soviet times, when similar sanctions were in place, there was a body called COCOM, which handled technology sanctions professionally. COCOM, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, was set up by the United States and its allies in 1949 to control exports of strategic technology to the Soviet bloc, and it worked until 1994.
The war is in its fifth year, and there is no such body.
Skilled people
There is one more vulnerability of Putin’s regime, and I know very well that I am not supposed to talk about it: skilled people.
If these skilled people are drawn out of Putin’s system, the effect is immediately visible on the battlefield.
Suppose you say: “Our security services do not want to do this work, and we would rather keep these people out, because there may be agents of the FSB, Russia’s security service, among them.” Fine. Then carry on helping Putin’s regime.
After Putin: not democracy, but a Russia that does not threaten its neighbors
Do not count on Russia becoming a democracy after Putin. That is ruled out for roughly 20 years.
The goal must be a Russia after Putin that is not aggressive toward its neighbors.
Can Europe do anything to make that happen? The answer is yes. We will discuss this in more detail at the Munich Security Conference, which meets every February.
But one thing is certainly necessary: decentralizing power in Russia. More parliamentarism, more federalism.
With North Korea sending troops to be slaughtered in order to help Putin, I