I am deeply skeptical that Putin will agree to stop the war without achieving the goals he has declared. He is convinced that the political changes which may take place in Europe will lead to a reduction in support for Ukraine. And if that support decreases, he believes he will be able to achieve his objectives and, in effect, force Ukraine to capitulate.
He is counting on these changes over the next six to nine months. While he has that expectation, I find it very difficult to believe that he will agree to stop.
His objectives are quite clear.
- First, the complete seizure of Donbas.
- Second, restrictions on Ukraine’s foreign policy and defense policy.
These are conditions that, by and large, no sovereign country can accept. After accepting such restrictions, it would be left completely defenseless against the Kremlin’s next military aggression. When Putin might take it into his head to attack again, nobody knows. It is impossible to predict.
There may be progress on particular questions, especially limiting attacks on the infrastructure used to supply food to world markets. But an actual end to the fighting this year is something I remain very doubtful about.
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Germany
The AfD’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt has, of course, caused a very serious discussion in Europe, and certainly in Germany itself. The party received 43.8% of the vote while advocating an end to sanctions against Russia, military assistance to Ukraine, and a return to purchases of Russian oil and gas. All of this encourages Putin’s expectations.
Nevertheless, we have to understand what kind of election this was. It was an election in one relatively small German ‘state’. Moreover, in eastern Germany, which has been a base of support for the radical right for decades. I think it highly unlikely that the AfD will achieve the same result in a federal election. And it is the federal government that determines German foreign policy.
This is a very important signal. But let me say again: it is a signal, and the German government and German political parties still have time to make changes to their policies.
The conduct of some of these parties in the European Parliament is certainly disturbing. We recently held an event there—we, meaning the Anti-War Committee of Russia—to discuss why Russia’s elections cannot be considered legitimate. A few days beforehand, Russia’s foreign intelligence service issued a statement about enemies preparing to discredit the elections. Then representatives of right-wing European parties turned up and kicked up an enormous row, trying to prevent even an ordinary expert hearing. In effect, they were supporting the position of Russian foreign intelligence. This was a fairly routine discussion, and they were trying to stop even that.
But we also need to understand why people vote for these parties.
Of course, there are people in Germany who think it would be good to receive cheap Russian gas again, and perhaps to help Ukraine less. In Saxony-Anhalt, that position has particular importance because chemical enterprises there depended heavily on cheap Russian gas.
Nevertheless, if we look at the German economy as a whole, the practical significance of restoring those supplies is much smaller. Russia offers discounts to its customers, and it is these discounts that some AfD voters are counting on. But the savings are not decisive for an economy of Germany’s size.
In my view, even assistance to Ukraine is a secondary question for German voters. The central question is migration. This is a serious concern for German voters, and they direct that concern at their government.
If the government hears its population, the AfD can go back below the five-per-cent threshold. If it does not, the German political system, and the European political system more generally, face serious upheaval. These problems will remain with European politicians for years.
France
From this point of view, Marine Le Pen coming to power in France could create considerably greater problems. We would be talking about the presidency, and the French president has exceptionally broad powers in foreign policy.
But there is another question here. We cannot simply equate the radical right with supporters of Putin. Or, incidentally, with supporters of Trump. In many cases these are isolationists, opponents of the Atlantic alliance.
We have seen this kind of expectation before. Stalin tried to be friends with Hitler. There were raw-material supplies, industrial supplies, all these apparently mutually beneficial relations. We know how that ended. I very much hope the lessons have been learned, and even today’s most extreme European parties do not display Hitler’s level of radicalism. But the assumption that such parties will necessarily be Russia’s friends deserves some skepticism.
For now, Putin expects their success to reduce support for Ukraine. That expectation is one reason I doubt he will agree to stop fighting without getting what he wants.
As for whether these politicians will turn out to be friends of Russia, or friends of Putin personally, that is something Mr Putin still has to find out.
For a closer look at Putin’s expectations of Europe’s rightward shift, read NEST’s weekly briefing and subscribe to receive a new one next Monday.
Putin clearly has a fixed delusion.
And he will succeed. I have no doubt that the AfD will win the next general election in Germany.