The Iran War Is Good for Putin — but Not Good Enough

Oil revenue, distracted West, and the enduring limits of Russia's army

The war in Iran has created a limited window of opportunity for the Kremlin to intensify its offensive in Ukraine. Higher oil prices are filling the budget, the crisis around Iran is diverting American attention, competition for air defence systems and ammunition is growing, and divisions within the European Union are slowing the flow of aid to Kyiv. However, this window is narrow, and it does not guarantee a military breakthrough. Spring mud season and the structural weaknesses of the Russian army will prevent any rapid shift in the balance of power on the battlefield.

The most likely outcome is that the Kremlin will continue doing what it has been doing — gradually pushing Ukrainian forces back along selected sections of the front.

The oil dividend

The war has turned high energy prices into a significant resource for Moscow. Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz removed a substantial share of global oil supply from the market, and demand for Russian crude rose sharply. A $10 per barrel increase in export prices generates roughly $1.1–1.2 billion in additional monthly revenue for the Russian budget. Given that the average price of Russian export oil in January and February stood at around $42 per barrel, it is reasonable to expect that April alone will bring no less than $4.5 billion in additional income.

At the same time, higher energy prices complicate the task for Western governments. The more expensive oil and gas become, the harder it is to maintain strict sanctions and an aggressive policy of rejecting Russian energy without provoking domestic discontent. These expanded opportunities for selling Russian oil give the Kremlin greater confidence that it can continue the war through 2026 without resorting to the non-military budget cuts that the Finance Ministry had begun planning.

The distraction dividend

The conflict is also diverting Western attention from Ukraine. The escalation around Iran has already stalled the negotiating process, reduced the intensity of debates over new aid packages for Kyiv, slowed decision-making, and strengthened the position of those within the EU who argue for a “pause” in supporting Ukraine. Moreover, the war has intensified competition for the same limited production capacity — air defence systems, ammunition, spare parts — turning Ukraine into one of several recipients of finite resources. This does not mean that aid to Kyiv will stop, but the risk of delays has increased, and delays directly affect Ukraine’s ability to compensate for Russia’s numerical advantage on the battlefield and to protect its energy and industrial infrastructure.

Why none of these guarantee Moscow a turning point in the war

However, this window for increased pressure on Ukraine does not guarantee Moscow a turning point in the war. Given its internal constraints, the Kremlin is unlikely to attempt a rapid breakthrough of the front line. It will prefer to continue a slow war of attrition.

Russia continues to run up against the quality and structure of its military force. The bulk of its experienced officer and NCO corps has been lost, which reduces the army’s capacity to plan and execute complex offensive operations. Although the Kremlin always retains the option of launching a large-scale mobilisation at relatively short notice, there are no signs that one is approaching. To maintain the necessary pace of its creeping mobilisation, the regime is encouraging regions to make active use of new recruitment practices — pressuring students with academic debts, tightening the rules around alternative civilian service, and aggressively recruiting contract soldiers, reservists, and foreign nationals. The result is an influx of less trained and less motivated personnel.

At the same time, a rapid expansion of the army’s numbers would more likely reduce its combat effectiveness than enhance it, since there are neither sufficient training centres nor the necessary equipment to prepare hundreds of thousands of new recruits. Furthermore, the Ukrainian military’s active and skilled use of drones has made it substantially harder to assemble the large troop concentrations required for major breakthroughs anywhere within 50 kilometres of the front line. This effectively rules out the possibility of a surprise strike, making large-scale operations far less effective and scenarios of a rapid collapse of Ukrainian defences unrealistic.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, this configuration does not look like failure. In the absence of any realistic chance of a quick military breakthrough on the one hand, and with well-founded doubts about Donald Trump’s ability to compel Volodymyr Zelensky to accept peace on Russian terms on the other, the Russian army is slowly pushing Ukrainian forces out of Donbas, advancing toward Zaporizhzhia, and occupying small territories in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. These territories may serve as bargaining chips at the moment when the two sides approach the fixing of a line of separation.

For the time being, Vladimir Putin is able to demonstrate to his inner circle and to President Trump that his uncomplicated military tactics allow him to convert minimal tactical gains into a gradual shift of the front line in Russia’s favour. In such a situation, he has no incentive to resort to risky decisions or to make serious concessions in negotiations, whenever they resume.